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The rich history of war provides evidence of 
its devastating consequences and of the wide 
variety of circumstances that lead to it. While 
there is much that we know about wars, there is 
still much to be learned about how the choice to 
go to war differs across countries and circum­
stances, and in particular how this relates to the 
interplay between economic circumstances and 
political regimes. Although religious and ethnic 
conflicts have played key roles in many wars, 
balance of power, territorial disputes, expan­
sion of territory, and access to key resources or 
wealth are often either involved or the primary 
driving force behind wars. In this paper, we 
 See, for example, Geoffrey Blainey (973) and David 
Kaiser (990).
 Resources and wealth are the focus of much of the 
recent formal literature on war, as discussed below. 
Moreover, materialistic motivations have been identified 
as primary source of wars in the history of empires (see, 
for example, William V. Harris 979 and Ronald Findlay 
996), and some scholars argue that modernization has 
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build a model that serves as a basis for under­
standing how political structure (crudely mod­
eled) interacts with economic incentives to 
determine when wars occur.
Our model of war is described as follows. 
Two countries are faced with a possible war, and 
each knows their respective probability of win­
ning, which depends on their respective wealth 
levels. If a war ensues, each country incurs a 
cost and then the victor claims a portion of the 
loser’s wealth. The incentives of each country 
thus depend on the costs, the potential spoils, 
and the probability that each will win. If either 
country wishes to go to war, then war ensues. 
Countries can offer to give (or receive) a transfer 
in order to avoid a war.
The way in which we tie the analysis back 
to political structure is crude but powerful. 
We model a country’s decisions through the 
eyes of the pivotal decision maker in the 
society. For instance, this could be an executive, 
a monarch, the median member of an oligarchy, 
or the median voter, depending on the political 
regime. The ratio of share of benefits from war 
further increased the profitability of conquest (see Peter 
Liberman 993, who discusses Hitler’s exploitation of occu­
pied territories during World War II). A recent example of 
a war related to materialistic expansion motivations is the 
invasion of Kuwait in 990. We stress that by materialistic 
motivations we include power and control motivations of 
country leaders, and hence our arguments apply even when 
no territory or resource is a cause of war.
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compared to share of costs for this pivotal agent 
is thus a critical determinant of a country’s deci­
sions. We call this ratio “political bias.” If it is 
close to one, then the country’s critical decision 
maker’s relative benefits/costs are similar to the 
country at large. If this ratio is greater than one, 
then we say that the country leader has a “posi­
tive bias.” An unbiased leader is “representa­
tive” of the interests of the country, in the sense 
that he or she sees the same relative benefits 
and costs from a war as the country does as a 
whole. Hence, absence of bias may be seen as an 
operationalization of a representativeness prop­
erty associated with the level of democracy of a 
political regime.3
Political bias essentially embodies anything 
that might lead to different incentives for the 
critical decision maker relative to the society as a 
whole. For instance, in an authoritarian regime, 
it may be that a leader can keep a disproportion­
ate share of the gains from a war. It may also 
be that the leader sees other gains from war, in 
personal recognition or power. Similarly, if the 
military is leading a country, then it may be that 
military leaders gain disproportionately from 
war in terms of accumulated power, or even in 
keeping their troops occupied. These effects are 
not unique to autocratic or oligarchic regimes, 
but can also occur in democracies.4 Sometimes 
a leader knows that (s)he is more easily reelected 
if the country is at war at the time of the elec­
tions, or may have other indirect benefits in 
terms of benefiting friends or companies to 
which he or she has ties. It is also important to 
note that bias can also go in the other direction. 
For instance, if a democratic leader risks losing 
office if a war is lost, then that might lead him 
or her to overweight the costs of war relative to 
3 To the extent that a democracy is embodied by the 
median voter, this then embodies the relative distribution of 
the costs and benefits of a war across the population, where 
things like relative tax rates can be influential.
4 An argument in favor of the hypothesis that democra­
cies tend to be less biased can be found in David A. Lake 
(99): “State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a 
country’s foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democra­
cies, where the costs to society of controlling the State are 
relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs 
are higher.”
gains, resulting in a bias factor of less than one.5, 6 
In general, political bias reflects the different 
cost/benefit calculation of the agent (the leader 
or pivotal decision maker in the government) 
who bargains on behalf of the principal (the 
country). This agency problem can determine 
conflict, even when countries have accurate 
intelligence about each other’s military capa­
bilities, and even when they have the power to 
bargain and make transfers to avoid a war.
We show that if both countries have unbiased 
leaders, then war can be avoided, provided the 
countries can make transfers and provided they 
can commit to peace conditional on receiving 
transfers. If either country has a leader with 
positive bias, however, then war can ensue, and 
whether it does depends on the specifics of the 
war technology, relative wealth, potential costs 
and spoils of war, and the size of the biases. We 
also study such bargaining when neither country 
can commit to peace after receiving transfers.7 
In that case, the incentives are more compli­
cated, as it must be that after receiving a trans­
fer, a war would no longer be worthwhile for the 
potential aggressor. When peace treaties are not 
5 For an analysis of the political costs of war for differ­
ent regimes, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph 
M. Siverson (995) and Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E. 
Goemans (004) .
6 See George W. Downs and David M. Rocke (994) 
and Ahmer Tarar (006) for different discussions of the 
incentives of an executive to engage in war relative to the 
electorate’s incentives to retain the executive.
7 This commitment problem is usually studied in 
dynamic models. For example, in Michael A. Schwarz and 
Konstantin Sonin (004) war can be avoided with a contin­
uous stream of transfers that comes at a fast enough rate to 
always have the aggressor wish to delay rather than attack. 
Along similar lines, James Fearon (996) shows that as 
long as commitment not to go to war after receiving a trans­
fer exists for one period, the long­run commitment can be 
brought back in, through an appropriate dynamic mecha­
nism. In our no­commitment model, a transfer doesn’t bind 
the actions of the receiver for any length of time, and hence 
those results do not apply.
 Given that the attention of empirical studies and his­
torians has largely been on wars and armed conflicts that 
actually occurred, it is difficult to find direct empirical 
evidence of transfers that avoided a war, for the obvious 
counterfactual reasons. Nevertheless, one can certainly 
see the role of transfers in many epochs. By transfers we 
do not refer to explicit monetary transfers only; we refer 
also to transfers of territory, control over seas, and even 
implicit transfers of wealth and control linked to the mar­
riages between royal families across Europe up to the end 
of the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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 enforceable, even two countries with unbiased 
leaders (or, in short, unbiased countries) may go 
to war, depending on the sensitivity of the prob­
ability of winning to the difference in power.
Our model suggests some novel considerations 
regarding the so­called “Democratic Peace” (or 
“Liberal Peace”) observation, where two democ­
racies are much less likely to go to war with 
each other than are two countries when at least 
one is not a democracy (see, e.g., Michael W. 
Doyle 96 and Bruce Russett 993). We show 
that, at most, one of two unbiased countries will 
want to go to war, and if binding treaties can be 
written, then two unbiased countries can always 
reach an agreement over transfers that will avoid 
a war. We can call this unbiased peace, and it 
can be interpreted as a new explanation of the 
democratic peace observation under the hypoth­
esis that democracies tend to be less biased than 
nondemocratic regimes.9 Wars between democ­
racies are avoided not due to similarity of norms 
or cultural affinities, but due to a lack of politi­
cal bias in the bargaining process (determined 
perhaps by the system of checks and balances 
typical of a democracy). Our model does predict 
that two politically biased democracies could 
still go to war with each other if they are each 
sufficiently biased. Thus, mutual democracy is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
peace.
centuries there was an explicit system of compensations 
among European great powers: the first (77) and the third 
(795) partition of Poland, the Franco­British and Russo­
British negotiations prior to the formation of the Entente 
Cordiale, as well as the resolutions of the Near Eastern 
crises of 75–77 and 5–. Trade concessions or 
replacements of ministers could be indirect forms of trans­
fers to the threatening power as well. The most important 
principle in UN Security Council resolution 4 was “land 
for peace,” and such a principle was used as the basis for 
Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt in 979, and was at the cen­
ter of the Oslo Accords with the PLO. Another example 
is the provision of iron and logistical support by Sweden 
to Hitler in World War II. A notable example of failure of 
appeasement due to a lack of commitment is the Munich 
Agreement of 93.
9 The idea that incentives of aristocrats to go to war 
might differ from those of democratic leaders is not new, 
and is well articulated in Immanuel Kant (795). The nov­
elty here is in explicitly modeling bias in a model where 
we can understand its role in bargaining to avoid war, and 
its interaction with commitment and the technology of war, 
as well as a country’s incentives to select its leaders and 
their bias.
Using political bias as the key driver of war, 
and assuming a negative correlation between 
political bias and the level of democracy, our 
model provides an explanation of the stylized 
fact that democracies tend to win wars against 
autocracies: ceteris paribus, more biased lead­
ers are willing to enter conflicts that they have a 
lower probability of winning (see David A. Lake 
99 for a related argument). Another stylized 
fact (see Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Campbell 
99) that our model can explain relates to the 
effect of the size of a democracy on its incentives 
to go to war versus bargaining, depending on the 
sensitivity of the probability of winning to the 
difference in wealth between contenders.0
Another phenomenon on which our model can 
shed light is the so­called uneven contenders 
paradox, first discussed by Carl von Clausewitz 
(3), which refers to situations in which one 
small or weak country doesn’t concede or is the 
initiator of conflict, even though it expects losses 
from a war. In our model, the weaker country can 
in fact be the aggressor because of the leader’s 
bias and/or because the probability of winning, 
or war technology, is not very sensitive to the 
difference in power between the contenders. In 
other words, “who attacks whom” depends not 
only on relative wealths but, crucially, also on 
their relative bias and on the technology of war.
The sensitivity of war technology is shown to 
be one of the key determinants of the incentives 
to form coalitions as well: when the war tech­
nology is not too sensitive to power differences, 
there are no incentives to form alliances, defen­
sive or offensive, whereas when the war technol­
ogy is very sensitive, there can be incentives to 
form offensive alliances and/or defensive alli­
ances, depending on the distribution of wealth. 
0 Given that the model aims to isolate and highlight the 
effect of bias and does not include other important domes­
tic characteristics of different political regimes, there are 
other observations on democratic peace (see, e.g., Bueno 
De Mesquita et al. 999) that cannot be explained with 
our simple model. For example, since we do not analyze 
strategic timing issues, the model cannot explain why 
democracies seem to be more likely to initiate wars against 
autocracies than vice versa.
 Jack Hirshleifer (99) was the first to call the prob­
ability of winning in a contest the “technology of conflict.” 
We believe this terminology is appropriate since the sen­
sitivity of the probability of winning to the relative posi­
tions of the contenders is mostly influenced by military 
technology.
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A strong form of stability, where no group of 
countries could gain by reorganizing them­
selves into new alliances, will generally not be 
attainable in this case of sensitive war technol­
ogy. This is related to issues of empty­cores in 
a variety of coalitional games with some sort 
of competition. In settings where core­stability 
fails, it makes sense to explore weaker forms of 
stability. We show that it is possible to sustain 
large alliances of countries.
We also examine the incentives of citizens 
to (s)elect leaders of different biases. In the 
absence of transfers, a country would prefer 
to have an unbiased leader. On the other hand, 
when transfers are available, a country may 
benefit from having a biased leader who extracts 
transfers from other countries, provided the bias 
is not so strong to lead the country into unde­
sired wars. Examining equilibrium choices of 
bias of two countries, we see that at least one 
country chooses a biased leader and there can 
be multiple such equilibria. Once we introduce 
uncertainty regarding the opponent’s wealth and 
power at the time of the choice of leaders, war 
can occur in equilibrium.
To clarify the connection of this paper with 
the existing rational choice literature in interna­
tional relations, note that in any “realist” frame­
work (a term due to von Clausewitz 3), war is 
based on practical cost/benefit calculations and 
with full knowledge of circumstances. As an 
example of rational realist model, Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita (9) studies war as based on cost/
benefit calculations by countries (interpreted as 
unitary actors). In such models, if one allows 
for bargaining and transfers, war should not be 
possible, whereas in our model the agency prob­
lem identified by the presence of political bias 
breaks the unitary actor assumption and allows 
for novel explanations of war.
 Another possibility is to appeal to such other predic­
tions about outcomes as von Neumann–Morgenstern stable 
sets, as in James Jordan (006), who studies pillage games 
(those are coalitional games in which a coalition with more 
wealth than another can make the other surrender all or part 
of its wealth at no cost). Pillage is clearly related to war, but 
differs in that it is costless and the outcome is certain (the 
stronger takes from the weaker). See also Michel Piccione 
and Ariel Rubinstein (004), who examine distributions of 
resources across countries so that no country has any incen­
tive to take from another, where stronger countries can take 
costlessly and at will from weaker countries.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (003) analyze the 
variation across countries in terms of the nec­
essary support for a leader within the so­called 
“selectorate.” In their model, democratic lead­
ers need a larger coalition to support them rela­
tive to nondemocratic leaders. Keeping a larger 
coalition satisfied is more costly, and hence 
losing a war is relatively more costly for demo­
cratic leaders, and generally makes them less 
prone to war. Thus, beside the fact that Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. (003) do not analyze trans­
fers, their theory is based on a political leader 
maintaining an “internal” base, while ours is a 
complementary theory that focuses on political 
bias with respect to “external” bargaining.
In our model it is possible for two countries to 
go to war even though they both have complete 
information about the relative likelihood of win­
ning, and despite the fact that they could bargain 
and make payments to avoid war and that war 
burns resources. This is related to the “Hicks 
Paradox” from the bargaining literature which 
ponders the occurrence of strikes and failed bar­
gaining in general contexts. Since our model of 
war operates under complete information, it is 
complementary to models based on asymmetric 
information and differences in beliefs.3 Other 
complementary potential causes of war identi­
fied in the literature include the presence of indi­
visibilities in bargaining (see Jonathan Kirshner 
000), strategic timing considerations (summa­
rized, e.g., in James Fearon 995), and “spiral 
theories” of war (see, e.g., Kenneth Waltz 959, 
Thomas A. Schelling 963, Robert Jervis 976, 
97, and, more recently, Sandeep Baliga and 
Tomas Sjöström 004). In John F. Nash (953), 
Schelling (966), and Vincent P. Crawford 
(9), bargaining can break down because of 
excessive demands or excessive commitments 
to fight made during the bargaining process, 
whereas in our model bargaining would not 
break down if the biases are not too high. Thus, 
in our model the source of ex post conflict is in 
3 Explanations of wars based on miscalculations or 
errors due to lack of information or to different priors about 
relative power have been discussed by Blainey (973), Erik 
A. Gartzke (999), and R. Harrison Wagner (000), among 
others. As argued by Fearon (995, 997), once we allow 
for bargaining and communication, these explanations are 
consistent if there are strategic incentives to hide (or not to 
reveal) information or problems with signalling.
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the excessively aggressive agents chosen by the 
principal selectorates. The source of bargaining 
failure in our model is therefore more closely 
related to delegation games (Chaim Fershtman 
and Kenneth L. Judd 97) such as that of 
Stephen R. G. Jones (99), where there is an 
explicit combination of agency and bargaining 
problems.4
I.  A Materialistic Model of War
We first focus on a potential war between two 
countries in complete isolation. We denote the 
countries by i and j. We return to the case of 
more countries below.
Let wi denote the total wealth of country i.
We model the technology of war in a sim­
ple way. If countries i and j go to war against 
each other, country i prevails with probability 
pi 1wi, wj 2 , which is nondecreasing in wi and 
nonincreasing in wj.5 When the wealth levels 
are clear, we let pij denote pi 1wi, wj 2 . The prob­
ability that country i prevails is pji 5  2 pij. 
This simple form ignores the possibility of a 
stalemate or any gradation of outcome, but still 
captures the essence of war necessary to under­
stand the incentives to go to war. Note that it 
is possible that pi 1wi, wj 2 Z 1/2 when wi 5 wj. 
This allows i, for instance, to have some geo­
graphic, population, or technological advantage 
or disadvantage.
In terms of the consequences of a war, we 
model the costs and benefits as follows. 
Regardless of winning or losing, a war costs a 
country a fraction C . 0 of its wealth. If a coun­
try wins, then it gains a fraction G . 0 of the 
other country’s wealth.6 So, after a war against 
country j, country i’s wealth is wi 1 2 C 2 G2 
4 In contrast to our model, however, in Jones (99) the 
choice of agents by the two principals in the first stage does 
not affect the disagreement point or possible agreements of 
the second­stage bargaining problem. In our model, the dis­
agreement utility (war payoffs) and the potential transfers 
are affected by the biases, and so by choosing the biases the 
countries are changing the key elements of the subsequent 
bargaining game.
5 For empirical support of the hypothesis that the prob­
ability of winning depends on the relative wealth levels 
(supposing that relative wealth levels determine relative 
levels of war mobilization), see Mark Harrison (005) and 
Charles Tilly (99).
6 We could also add fixed costs and/or benefits. 
However, adding such parameters would add little to the 
if it loses and wi 1 2 C 2 1 Gwj if it wins. We 
let C 1 G # , so that at most the full wealth of 
a country can be lost to the cost of war and the 
other country.
When two countries meet, they each decide 
whether to go to war, and if either decides to go 
to war then a war occurs. As part of the deci­
sion process they may be able to make trans­
fers of resources or territory, or to make other 
concessions.
Let aj denote the fraction of wj controlled by 
the agent who is pivotal in the decisions of coun­
try j. The fraction of the spoils of war that the 
pivotal agent might control can differ from the 
fraction of the wealth that they hold, especially 
in nondemocratic regimes or in situations where 
there might be other sorts of benefits from war 
(for instance, to a pivotal military leader). The 
fraction of the spoils of war obtained by the 
pivotal agent is a9j. Thus, in the absence of any 
transfers, the pivotal agent of a country j wishes 
to go to war if and only if 7
()  11 2 C 2ajwj 2 11 2 pji 2Gajwj 1 pjiGa9jwi
    . ajwj,
where the left­hand side is the expected value 
of a war and the right­hand side is the expected 
value of not going to war.
We can rewrite this so that the expected gains 
are on the left­hand side and the expected losses 
are on the right­hand side:
()  pjiGa9jwi . 3C 1 11 2 pji 2G 4ajwj.
A. Political Bias
Let Bj 5 a9j /aj denote the ratio of the per­
centage that the pivotal decision­making agent 
qualitative analysis of the interaction of political bias and 
war incentives.
7 We examine this as if the other country were choosing 
not to go to war. Although this could turn out to be a hypo­
thetical comparison, it is still the relevant one, as the equi­
librium outcome (in the absence of transfers) would be that 
the countries end up going to war if and only if the inequal­
ity holds for at least one of the two countries’ leaders.
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stands to gain versus what he or she has at risk. 
We call this the political bias of country j.
It is important to emphasize that although we 
model the relative gains and losses as being pro­
portional to wealth, the critical aspect of politi­
cal bias in our model is that there is a difference 
between the incentives of the pivotal decision 
maker and the country as a whole. This might, 
more generally, include things like potential 
power that a military leader or politician might 
gain from winning a war, which would bias 
them away from considering the pure costs and 
gains from war and can effectively be viewed 
as a distorted view of gains 1a9j . aj 2 . We also 
note that bias could similarly be less than . It 
could be, for instance, that a politician fears los­
ing office due to a lost war, and this could mani­
fest itself in having the politician overweight the 
losses of a war.
We can rewrite () as:
(3)  Bj pjiGwi . 3C 1 11 2 pji 2G 4wj.
This inequality, where the left­hand side is 
the normalized expected gains (having divided 
by aj ) and the right­hand side is the normalized 
expected costs, makes the role of the bias quite 
clear. If Bj . , then the leader overweights 
potential gains (since in this case the rest of the 
country has a ratio at stake 1 2 a9j 2 / 1 2 aj 2 
, ); while if it is less than , it underweights 
potential gains.
We note some intuitive comparative statics.
The “tendency” of j to want to go to war 
(as measured in the range of parameter values 
where j wants to go to war):
• Is increasing in Bj and G, and decreasing in 
C;
• Depends only on the ratio of C/G and not on 
the absolute levels of either C or G: and
• Depends only on Bj and not on the absolute 
levels of either aj or a9j.
These show the intuitive comparative statics 
that a larger bias makes a country more prone to 
war, as does an increase in the ratio of benefits to 
costs of war. The effects of the wealth levels, wi 
and wj, are ambiguous, as they enter through pji, 
as well as directly. For instance, as wi increases, 
the potential spoils from war increase, but the 
probability of winning for j decreases. Which 
of these two effects dominates depends on the 
technology of war.
Given this dependence on the technology, 
for the purposes of illustration it is useful to 
carry several examples of winning probabilities 
throughout.
Example 1. Proportional Probability of Winning: 
We say that the probability of winning is pro­
portional (to relative wealths) if pji 5 wj / 1wj 1 
wi 2 .
In this case, (3) can be rewritten as
(4)  
1Bj 2 1 2Gwi
wi 1 wj
 . C.
REMARK : Under a proportional probability 
of winning, a politically unbiased country never 
wishes to go to war. If Bj . , then the tendency 
for j to want to go to war is increasing in wi and 
decreasing in wj.
Example 2. Fixed Probability of Winning: We say 
that the probability of winning a war is fixed if 
pji 5 1/2, regardless of wealth levels. This is an 
extreme case of situations in which wealth has 
no impact on the probability of winning a war.
In that case, (3) can be rewritten as
(5)  Bj
wi
wj
 . 1 1 2CG .
Here, an unbiased country could want to go to 
war, but only if its wealth is low compared to the 
other country. In general, in this case a country’s 
tendency to want to go to war is higher if it has 
relatively less wealth.
Example 3. Higher Wealth Wins: We say that the 
higher wealth wins if pji 5  when wj . wi, 
pji 5 0 when wj , wi, and pji 5 1/2 when wj 5 wi. 
This is another extreme case that captures situa­
tions in which wealth is the critical determinant 
of the probability of winning a war.
In this case, a country j wishes to go to war 
(in the absence of transfers) whenever wj . wi 
and gains outweigh losses, BjGwi . Cwj. When 
wealths are equal, the expected gains­versus­
losses condition is as in the fixed case.
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Example  and Example 3 will also be referred 
to, respectively, as the extremely insensitive and 
extremely sensitive war technologies.
II.  The Interplay between Political Bias  
and Transfers
We begin with the important benchmark 
where no transfers are possible.
A. War Incentives in the Absence  
of Transfers
When two countries meet, it could be that nei­
ther country wishes to go to war, just one coun­
try wishes to go to war, or both countries wish to 
go to war. If neither wishes it, then clearly there 
is no war, and transfers would be irrelevant. If 
both countries wish war, then there is a war and 
no transfers could possibly avoid it. The only 
situation where one country might be willing to 
make transfers that could induce the other coun­
try to avoid a war comes when only one country 
has an interest in engaging in war. Let us first 
make some observations regarding the param­
eters that lead to the various possible scenarios, 
and then come back to focus on transfers.
PROPOSITION  (No Transfers): Consider any 
fixed wi, wj, and pij.
 (i) If Bi 5 Bj 5 , then at most one country 
wishes to go to war regardless of the other 
parameters.
 (ii) Fixing any ratio C/G, if Bi and Bj are both 
sufficiently large, then both countries wish 
to go to war.
 (iii) Fixing any Bi and Bj, if C/G is large enough, 
then neither country wishes to go to war.
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
For fixed biases Bi . , Bj . , and a fixed 
ratio C/G, whether or not one or both countries 
wish to go to war depends on the technology 
pi 1 · , · 2 and the wealth levels in ways that may 
not be purely monotone.
B. Transfers to Avoid a War:  
The Commitment Case
We now consider situations where in the 
absence of any transfers one country would like 
to go to war but the other would not, and charac­
terize when it is that transfers avoid a war.
We start with the case where countries can 
commit to peace conditional on the transfer. 
This is a situation where the countries can sign 
some (internationally) enforceable treaty so 
that they will not go to war conditional on the 
transfer. In the absence of such enforceability or 
commitment, it could be that i makes the trans­
fer to j and then j invades anyway. We deal with 
the case of no commitment in the next section.
Commitment could come from international 
organizations to the extent that they have threats 
and promises to help enforce peace agreements 
(e.g., the United Nations), or, alternatively, from 
longer­term reputation effects. If a country is to 
face a number of countries over time, then by 
abiding by its promises it will earn future trans­
fers, while otherwise it will end up fighting a 
series of wars. Clearly, if transfers are prefer­
able to war in each case, then the country would 
prefer to have a series of transfers to a series of 
wars.
When transfers are made from country i to 
country j, we assume that the decision maker in 
country j gets a9j of the transfer, and the decision 
maker in country i loses ai of the transfer. Thus, 
decision makers’ biases toward transfers are the 
same as those toward gains and losses from war. 
This is not critical to any of the results, as it is 
important only that a bias be present somewhere. 
We make this assumption to be consistent with 
gains and losses.9
The aim is to identify when it is that transfers 
will avoid a war. That is, we would like to know 
when is it that:
 We note that the commitment case also embodies no 
change in leaders (or their biases) over time, or at least some 
continuity in their incentives. To the extent that democracies 
change leaders frequently, one can at least imagine there 
being a problem of a new leader abiding by old agreements. 
However, that can be alleviated by reputation effects.
9 For instance, our results still hold qualitatively (with 
some differences in the exact equations), if we assume that 
decision makers evaluate all transfers (in or out) at a rate of 
aj (or all at a9j).
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• In the absence of transfers, j wants to go to 
war with i;
• i prefers to pay tij . 0 to j rather than going to 
war; and
• j would prefer to have peace and the transfer 
tij to going to war.
It is important to note that when we say that 
transfers avoid a war, we are imposing the con­
straint that a war would have occurred in the 
absence of any transfers.
As we show in the Appendix, the following 
condition characterizes the situations where 
transfers avoid a war:
(6)  pjia1 1 Bjwiwjb 2 1 . CG .
   
11 2 pji 2 1Bi Bj 2 1 2a1 1 Bj wiwjb  ,
The left­hand side corresponds to country j 
wanting to go to war in the absence of any 
transfers, while the right­hand side corresponds 
to the willingness of i to make a transfer that 
would induce j to no longer want to go to war. 
Based on this set of inequalities, we conclude 
the following.
PROPOSITION : Consider a case where j 
wishes to go to war (in the absence of any trans-
fers) while i does not. Holding all else equal, 
the range of relative costs to gains, C/G, where 
a transfer can be made that will avoid a war, 
increases (in the sense of set inclusion) when
• Bi decreases,
• pji increases, and
• wi  /wj increases (holding pji fixed).0
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
The proposition is fairly intuitive. Reducing 
Bi makes i less likely to want to go to war, and 
to gain less from a war, and hence willing to 
0 If we do not hold pji fixed, then things are ambiguous, 
as larger relative wealth makes i better able to pay, but also 
better able to win.
make larger transfers to avoid it. Increasing pji 
or wi  /wj (holding pji fixed) has the same effect, 
and also increases the range where j would like 
to go to war in the absence of any transfers. So, 
for instance, a technological change that exog­
enously favors one country in a war (an increase 
in pji ) makes transfers more likely to avoid war, 
especially when the challenger is more politi­
cally biased and/or poorer. It is important to 
note that it need not be the wealthier country 
that is the challenger. A poor but politically 
biased country can extract transfers.
The effect of the political bias of the potential 
attacking country j, Bj, is ambiguous. It makes 
country j more aggressive, but also leads i to be 
willing to make larger transfers. Which effect 
dominates depends on a variety of factors.
To illustrate the proposition, we consider the 
extreme benchmark cases. In the benchmark 
case where pji 5 1/2 regardless of wealth levels 
(Example ), (6) implies that there exists a range 
of values of C/G such that transfers help avoid 
war if and only if
 Bi , Bj awiwjb2.
So in this case it is very clear that transfers help 
the most when Bi is small, Bj is large, and/or 
wi  /wj is large. These correspond to situations 
where the transferring country is less biased, 
the aggressor is more biased, and the wealth at 
risk for the transferring country relative to the 
aggressor is larger. In the other extreme case 
where the higher wealth wins (Example 3), and 
when j has a relative wealth advantage, (6) sim­
plifies to
 Bj 
wi
wj
 . 
C
G . 0.
Here, war is again “more avoidable” with larger 
bias Bj and larger wi  /wj (which leads to larger 
 Note that this description is consistent with some 
interpretations of the behavior of the dictator of North 
Korea (even though there is also a security concern): the 
biased leader of a poor country with access to a potential 
jump in the probability of winning a war with a neighbor 
may obtain transfers from other countries. Such transfers 
may depend on whether commitment problems can be over­
come, something that we come back to below.
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relative transfers), but now Bi is irrelevant as i 
is sure to lose.
In the case of two unbiased countries, we 
obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 3 (Unbiased Peace): Two unbi-
ased countries 1Bi 5 Bj 5 2 will never go to war 
if they can make transfers to each other and the 
receiver of a transfer can commit not to go to 
war after receiving the transfer.
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
The result is easy to understand. War imposes 
costs, and so when bargaining is unbiased, the 
total pie from avoiding a war is larger than the 
total pie from going to war. Thus, transfers avoid 
a war. The formal proof comes from noting 
that the right­hand side of (6) becomes 0 when 
Bi 5 Bj 5 , so one country is always willing 
to buy the other off. Thus, either war is avoided 
because neither wanted it in the first place, or 
because one country is willing to pay the other 
off (recalling that at most one unbiased country 
ever wants to go to war).
Proposition 3 identifies a new explanation for 
the observation that democracies rarely go to war 
with one another. Most of the explanations of 
this fact in the literature concern internal checks 
and balances within a democracy, or the cultural 
norms and relative affinities that one democracy 
has for another. Here we point out that two unbi­
ased countries (and hence two democracies to 
the extent that they have smaller biases than 
dictatorships, at least on average) never go to 
war because they can always find some transfer 
(perhaps bargaining under the threat of war) that 
makes it irrational to go to war.
It is important to note that this conclusion is 
true only for two politically unbiased countries 
and is not true if either country is politically 
biased. Also, this further makes the point that it 
is not democracy that is the key determinant of 
peace, but absence of political bias.
C. The No-Commitment Case
Let us now consider situations where a coun­
try cannot commit to avoid a war if it receives 
transfers. As discussed above, commitment is 
related to a number of factors: the presence or 
lack of international organizations that have the 
ability and incentives to enforce agreements, 
the patience of the challenger, the likelihood 
of meeting other countries in the future from 
which the challenger might gain from having 
maintained a reputation for abiding by its agree­
ments, etc. So, a lack of commitment power can 
stem from an absence of such institutions or 
dynamic incentives.
In the no­commitment case, in order to avoid 
a war, not only does a transfer have to be such 
that the potential aggressor is willing to forego 
the current opportunity for a war, but it also 
needs to be such that after the transfer has been 
made a war is no longer in the aggressor’s inter­
est. Transfers do three things:
• They make the target poorer and less 
appealing;
• They make the challenger richer, with more 
to lose; and
• They increase the probability that the chal­
lenger will win.
Here, we can see that there are countervail­
ing effects. If the probability is not affected too 
much by a transfer, then it is possible for trans­
fers to avoid a war, as transfers can change the 
wealth of the two countries so as to make it no 
longer in one country’s interest to invade the 
other.
There are a number of things that we observe 
about the no­commitment case. First, we can 
show that the situations where war is avoided due 
to transfers in the case of no commitment are a 
strict subset of those when there is commitment. 
In both cases, the transfers that the potential 
target country is willing to make are the same. 
The only differences are from the challenger’s 
perspective. The difference between the two 
 This contrasts with a model by Fearon (996), where 
a country can avoid a war by buying the other country off 
over time, and war never occurs. However, in Fearon’s 
model, by accepting an offer today the other side commits 
to waiting a period before attacking. That is, they cannot 
simply take the transfer and then fight immediately. Then 
the next period they can bargain again, and so forth. So, a 
small amount of commitment (to delay a period) allows the 
full impact commitment back in. In our model, we require 
that immediately after the transfer is made a country not 
want to turn around and attack.
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cases is that in the commitment case, a potential 
aggressor compares the value of no war (their 
wealth plus any transfers) to what they would 
gain from a war in the absence of any transfers; 
while in the no­commitment case a potential 
aggressor compares the value of no war (again, 
their wealth plus any transfers) to what they 
would gain from a war after transfers have been 
made. The value of a war to an aggressor after it 
has received transfers is strictly higher than the 
value of a war before any transfers, as the prob­
ability of winning is weakly higher and, in the 
case where transfers have already been made, 
the aggressor gets to keep a portion of those 
transfers regardless of whether it wins or loses, 
while in the other case they get that wealth only 
if they win.
Next, the no­commitment case has the fol­
lowing interesting feature. There are situations 
in which some transfers, tij . 0, would not avoid 
a war, yet there are lower transfers, t9ij , where 
tij . t9ij . 0, which would avoid a war. Thus, it 
is possible that too high a transfer will lead to 
war while a lower transfer will avoid a war. This 
can be true in a case where the changes in trans­
fers lead to substantial enough differences in 
the probability that the challenger wins the war. 
Larger transfers can lead the country making 
the transfers to be more vulnerable in terms of 
being more likely to lose a war, and thus higher 
transfers can end up leading to a war that lower 
transfers might have averted. This is illustrated 
in the following example.
First, we note that a transfer tij from country i 
to j creates a situation in which j does not want 
to go to war after having received the transfer in 
the case of no commitment, if 3
(7)  p9ji BjG 1wi 2 tij 2 
   # 1C 1 1 2 p9ji 2G2 1wj 1 Bj tij 2 ,
where p9ji 5 pji 1wj 1 tij, wi 2 tij 2 .
Example  4. Smaller Transfers Avoid a War: Let 
Bi 5 , Bj 5 4, wi 5 wj 5 00, C 5  ⁄0, G 5 
 ⁄0, and pij 1w, w 2 5 1/2.
3 This is simply a rewriting of (3) where i’s wealth is 
wi 2 tij, and where j’s wealth from the biased decision 
maker’s perspective is wj 1 Bj tij , but enters into the war 
technology as wj 1 tij.
Note that in this case (3) is satisfied, so ini­
tially j wishes to go to war with i.
We estimate (see (4) in the Appendix) that 
i would be willing to make a maximal transfer 
of t¯ij 5 0 to avoid war. In the case of commit­
ment, we can then check that this would avoid 
war (see () in the appendix, which is then 
satisfied).
Suppose that pji 10, 902 5 3/4. Thus, if a trans­
fer of t¯ij 5 0 is made, then j would still wish to 
go to war after the transfer, as (7) is not satisfied, 
and so the transfer would not avoid a war.
Consider, however, a smaller transfer of t 5 . 
Suppose that pji 10, 92 5 1/2 1 e. For small 
enough e, (7) is satisfied and so this smaller t 
avoids a war.
While the specific numbers in the example 
may seem contrived, it is not a knife­edge case. 
Moreover, this shows that we cannot adopt the 
method used to prove results in the last section, 
where we deduce the maximal possible transfer 
that a country is willing to make to avoid a war 
and see if that avoids a war. Without specify­
ing the p function, one cannot determine which 
transfers will avoid a war.
What we do know is that:
• The set of parameter values where transfers 
avoid a war is a subset of the commitment 
case;
• The set of parameters for which war is avoided 
grows as C/G increases; and
• The set of parameters for which war is avoided 
grows as Bi decreases.
The fact that smaller Bi helps avoid war is 
due to the fact that this results in an increase 
in the set of transfers that i is willing to make. 
The effect of C/G increasing is clear, as it helps 
make both countries wish to avoid a war. The 
effects of Bj and wi, wj are ambiguous, as again 
the technology of war 1pji 2 matters.
There are cases where we can deduce things 
about the ability of transfers to avoid war. The 
key to Example 4 is that there is a large change 
in probability due to a larger transfer, so there 
is a (local) convexity of the probability of win­
ning function. If the probability function is not 
affected at all, as in Example , or is propor­
tional, as in Example , then we can examine 
the maximal transfers as the relevant bench­
mark. The possibilities of avoiding war are still 
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D.  Endogenous Bias
As political bias affects a country’s decisions 
of whether to go to war and whether it receives 
or makes transfers, it is a critical dimension of 
a country. Most important, it could be that the 
representative citizen (that is, an unbiased citi­
zen) of a country would prefer to have a biased 
leader. As such, we ask which political bias a 
country prefers its leader to have, as viewed 
from the perspective of a representative (unbi­
ased) citizen. This is relevant not only because 
some countries choose their leaders, but also 
because it tells us which country leaders might 
best benefit its citizens.
We start by noting that in the absence of any 
transfers, the representative citizen of a country 
always prefers an unbiased leader over any other 
leader. In the absence of any transfers, the only 
decision is whether or not to go to war, and the 
representative (unbiased) citizen would prefer 
to have a decision maker who makes the same 
decisions the citizen would. An unbiased deci­
sion maker makes the same decisions that the 
representative citizen would, while someone 
with any bias would make different decisions in 
at least some contexts.
Now consider the case in which transfers are 
available and there is commitment. Here, having 
a biased leader can potentially benefit a country, 
as such a leader may extract transfers from other 
countries.6 It is useful to start with an example.
Example  5. Endogenous Bias and a Hawk-Dove 
Outcome: Let w1 5 w2 5 00 and p 1w, w 2 5 1/2. 
Let C 5 0.1 and G 5 0.4.
In the absence of transfers, a country would 
choose to attack the other if and only if its lead­
er’s bias is above .5. It is also useful to note that 
an unbiased leader is willing to pay up to 0 to 
avoid war.
So let us examine what happens for different 
combinations of biases of the leaders. To keep 
things simple, let us suppose that the bias levels 
that can be chosen are either  or 3 (which, as we 
country 3.5, but yields 4 in gains (as it wins for certain), and 
so the larger country will still go to war.
6 This can be seen as an example of a delegation game, 
where players might like to have agents play for them 
who have different preferences from their own (e.g., see 
Fershtman and Judd 97). See also Alastair Smith (99).
reduced relative to the commitment case, but the 
comparative statics are similar.
In particular, the unbiased peace result still 
holds for the case of a proportional p function.
PROPOSITION 4 (Unbiased Peace without 
Commitment): If the probability of winning is 
proportional to relative wealth, then two unbi-
ased countries 1Bi 5 Bj 5 2 will never go to war 
if they can make transfers to each other (even 
without commitment).
PROOF: 
In the case of proportional winning probabili­
ties, we know that an unbiased country will not 
wish to go to war with or without transfers.
This is clearly not true for all probability of 
winning functions. What is subtle is that, while 
it is true for proportional probabilities, it is not 
true for probability functions that are either less 
sensitive to relative changes in wealth or more 
sensitive to relative changes in wealth. This is 
seen as follows. First, consider a case where p is 
constant and equal to 1/2. In this case, a smaller 
country will wish to go to war with a larger one, 
as it has relatively little at risk and much to gain. 
The transfer that a larger country is willing to 
make is relative to its expected losses from a 
war. After having received a transfer, the small 
country could still have relatively more to gain 
from a war than it expects to lose.4 At the other 
extreme, where the country with higher wealth 
wins for sure, it is the larger country that is the 
aggressor. The smaller country is willing to 
pay something to avoid a war, but not its entire 
wealth. After having received a transfer, the 
larger country can still want to go to war, pro­
vided there is enough wealth left in the smaller 
country to justify the cost of war, as the larger 
country will win for sure.5
4 For a numerical example, suppose that wj 5  and 
wi 5 0, and that C 5 0. and G 5 0.. The maximal trans­
fer that i is willing to make is .9. If such transfers were 
made, the smaller country would have wealth .9 and the 
larger .. The smaller country would still wish to go to 
war.
5 For a numerical example, suppose that wi 5 0 and wj 
5 5, and C 5 0. and G 5 0.4. Here the maximal transfer 
that i is willing to make is 0. After such a transfer, the 
wealths are wi 5 0 and wj 5 35. A war then costs the larger 
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shall see shortly, correspond to extremes of the 
equilibria). If both countries have leaders with 
bias 3, then war is unavoidable. If both countries 
have leaders with bias , then no war occurs 
and no transfers are made. If one country has a 
leader with bias  and the other with bias 3, then 
a transfer of exactly 0 occurs and the countries 
do not go to war.
In such a situation, we can think of “equilib­
rium” biases. Two countries choosing their lead­
ers’ biases in this example are essentially playing 
a Hawk­Dove game. The unique (pure­strategy) 
type of equilibrium is for one of the countries to 
have a biased leader and the other not to.
More generally, the presence of transfers 
provides incentives for countries to select lead­
ers with high bias (more hawkish looking than 
the citizens would want in the absence of stra­
tegic considerations). The example above sug­
gests, however, that this cannot generally be 
true for both countries, since the representative 
citizens prefer to avoid war. Hence, the model 
suggests a simple reason for the coexistence of 
endogenously biased and unbiased leaders in 
equilibrium.
We can state this more generally. The game 
is described as follows. Fix w, w, C, G, and p. 
Countries simultaneously choose B, B. If there 
are mutually acceptable transfers that would 
avoid war in a case where war would occur in 
the absence of transfers given B, B, then the 
minimum transfer to avoid war is made and there 
is commitment so that no war then ensues.7 If 
there are no mutually acceptable transfers that 
would avoid war, then war ensues. If neither 
country wishes to go to war, then no transfers 
are made and there is no war.
An equilibrium is a pair B, B such that for 
each i there does not exist any B9i such that the 
expected utility of an unbiased citizen of coun­
try i in the game is greater under B9i, Bj than 
under Bi, Bj.
PROPOSITION 5: Consider the endogenous 
bias game in a situation where  . pi 1wi, wj 2 
. 0.
7 We could work with any predictable transfer scheme.
 In the extreme case where one of the countries wins 
for certain, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium 
appears to be an issue unless we put an upper bound on the 
possible bias choices.
 (i) There always exists an equilibrium that 
avoids war. In any such equilibrium B1 
$ 1 and B2 $ 1, with at least one holding 
strictly.
 (ii) The set of equilibria that avoid war is the 
pairs 1B, B2 such that B1 $  and B2 $  
and either
 • B1 $ Gw p 1 pw and B1B 2 Gw p2 
  5  1 Gp    , 
  or
 • B $ Gw p 1 pw and B 1B 2 Gw p2 
  5  1 Gp    . 
(iii) There exist equilibria where there is war if 
and only if pw . Cw1 and pw . Cw2.
PROOF: 
See the Appendix.
The pure strategy “war” equilibria in (iii) are 
somewhat less reasonable than the other equilib­
ria in the following sense. In such “war” equi­
libria, a country chooses a very high bias simply 
because it expects the other country to choose 
such a high bias that there is no chance of find­
ing transfers that will avoid a war in the second 
stage. These strategies are not quite eliminated 
via an elimination of dominated strategies, as 
it is still conceivable that the other country will 
choose a low bias (below ) and then the country 
will get a large payment, and so an iterative elim­
ination of weakly dominated strategies is needed 
to rule out such behavior.9 Alternatively, if one 
country moves first, there is a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome: it is the first coun­
try’s most preferred of the equilibrium outcomes 
described in Proposition 5, as effectively that 
country becomes a Stackleberg leader picking 
its highest possible bias where war is avoided.
The result above gives us an idea that there is 
a well­defined sense in which countries would 
prefer to have biased leaders. The argument then 
9 A representative citizen can generally lose only by hav­
ing a leader with a bias lower than  compared to having a 
leader with a bias of  (as the only time that changes outcomes 
is where the leader would make transfers that are larger than 
the citizen would be willing to make to avoid war).
Cw pw Cw
C
Cw pw Cw
C
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and war is avoided. If p 5 0, then the equilib­
rium is for country  to choose a bias of  and 
country  to choose a bias of no more than ; 
country  makes a transfer of 0 to country  
and again war is avoided.
With uncertainty, all equilibria have the fol­
lowing play on the equilibrium path: for higher 
values of p, country  will choose a bias of 3 and 
country  will choose a bias of no more than , 
and with probability p, a war will be avoided, 
but with a probability of 11 2 p 2  a war will 
ensue. Once p is low enough, country  plays 
a “safer” strategy of choosing a bias of  and 
country  responds with a bias of no more than 
 and war is always avoided. In this case, with 
probability 1 2 p country  gets a transfer of 
0, but with probability p the country ends up 
getting a lower transfer of 5. It is straightforward 
to verify the statements above, so we simply 
outline the main arguments. First, note that in 
any equilibrium, country,  will choose a bias of 
either  or 3. Choosing a bias above 3 is worse 
than choosing a bias slightly below 3, as the first 
strategy always leads to war while the second 
one leads to a response that leads to transfers in 
some cases and to an improvement for country . 
Choosing a bias below 3 and not equal to  is 
worse for country  than slightly increasing the 
bias, as this sometimes leads to a higher transfer 
(and it can be checked that country ’s response 
will result in war under the same circumstances 
and in higher transfers when transfers are made). 
Thus, things boil down to a choice of either  or 
3 for country . It is then easy to check that a 
bias of  will be chosen by country  only when 
it would be met with a response of a bias of no 
more than  by country , and otherwise a bias 
of 3 will be chosen and this must be responded 
to with a bias of no more than  in equilibrium 
(or else a deviation to a slightly lower bias would 
be improving, and we have already argued that 
such a bias is not part of an equilibrium).
III.  Stability and Alliances
Let us now consider settings where there are 
many countries.
the same for any bias that country  chooses, provided that 
bias does not exceed .
suggests that we should end up seeing an out­
come where at least one of the countries has a 
high bias and both biases are at least , and we 
should expect to see war avoided.
If we enrich this analysis by introducing some 
natural sort of uncertainty at the time where the 
bias is chosen, so that countries might not have 
a perfect prediction of their future wealth or of 
the future technology of war, then we should 
see positive biases and occasional wars. In par­
ticular, if we then examine an equilibrium with 
uncertainty, countries may end up choosing 
biases strictly above  and going to war with 
some positive probability. Announcing a bias 
below  is dominated by choosing a bias of , 
and a situation in which both countries choose 
a bias of  is not an equilibrium, as one country 
would gain by raising their announcement. So, 
equilibrium will involve some higher announce­
ments, but now the countries also trade off some 
probability of potential wars, depending on 
how the later uncertainty about relative wealth 
and probabilities of winning a war works out. 
Exactly how high that bias would be and how 
frequently war would ensue depend on the spe­
cifics of the uncertainty. The availability of 
transfers and enforceable treaties may therefore 
be themselves indirect causes of war, insofar as 
they give ex ante incentives to (s)elect biased 
leaders, and to the degree that there is substan­
tial uncertainty about the circumstances that the 
leaders will face.
As the trade­offs and basic ideas are fairly 
clear, and solving for the general form of equilib­
rium appears to be intractable, we illustrate these 
ideas with a simple extension of Example 5.
Example  6.  Endogenous Bias with Uncertainty: 
Let w1 5 w2 5 00, C 5 0.1, and p 100, 002 
5 1/2. The uncertainty is about the potential 
gains from war. It is G 5 0.4 with probability p 
and G 5 0.6 with probability 1 2 p.
We examine a case where country  chooses 
its bias first, and this is observed before coun­
try  chooses its bias.
If p 5 , then country  chooses a bias of 3 
and country  chooses a bias of no more than , 
country  makes a transfer of 0 to country ,30 
30 With the protocol of using the minimum transfer nec­
essary, the transfer needed to keep  from choosing war is 
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A.  Bilateral Stability
Consider some set of countries 5, … , n 6, 
their respective wealths 1w, … , wn 2 and biases 1B, … , Bn 2 , a technology of war that is specified 
for each pair ij, pij, and relative costs and gains 
C and G. We say that such a configuration of 
countries is bilaterally stable if there would be 
no war between any two of the countries if they 
met, even in the absence of any transfers.3
Bilateral stability is characterized by having 
(3) fail to hold for each pair of countries. We can 
see directly from (3) that if the relative costs of 
war (C/G) are high enough, then we will have 
bilateral stability. Beyond that, we need to know 
more about the probability of winning func­
tion and how that compares to the biases. The 
following proposition outlines one case where 
bilateral stability holds.
PROPOSITION 6 (Democratic Stability): If 
all countries are politically unbiased and the 
probability of winning a war is proportional 
to wealth, then the countries are bilaterally 
stable.
PROOF: 
This follows directly from Remark .
We can also say something about how biased 
countries can be while still having bilateral sta­
bility. The following proposition works for more 
general war technologies, but starting from a 
point where all countries have equal wealth.
PROPOSITION 7: If all countries have equal 
wealth and pij is symmetric,3 then the configu-
ration is bilaterally stable if and only if Bj # 
1 1 2CG  for all j.
PROOF: 
This follows from (3), setting pji 5 1/2 and wi 
5 wj.
3 In international relations there are a variety of notions 
of stability. Given that in a bilaterally stable situation no 
resource is transferred by definition, this notion is closest 
to that of “resource stability” in Emerson M.S. Niou et al. 
(99).
3 pij is symmetric if pij 1w, w92 5 pji 1w9, w 2 .
Beyond these propositions, bilateral stability 
can be directly characterized by bilateral checks 
of (3).
B. Coalitional Stability
Another question we address when exam­
ining many countries concerns alliances and 
coalitional stability.
One way of modeling alliances is as fol­
lows. When a set k of countries form an alli­
ance, the decision maker from country i still 
has aiwi in terms of wealth at risk (and thus 
loses 1C 1 G 2aiwi if a war is lost), and shares 
a9i  wi /g j[Kwj of the spoils of war or transfers. 
Alliance decisions are unanimous (pure col­
lective action). Each country’s decision maker 
must be willing to undertake an offensive war in 
order for it to happen. The default is not to attack 
unless the coalition is unanimous about doing so, 
which reflects the idea that the coalition might 
dissolve otherwise.33 The maximum total trans­
fer that an alliance might make in order to avoid 
a war is the maximum sum of transfers across 
its members, such that each would be willing to 
contribute their part in order to avoid a war.
The technology of war is presumed to be 
given by a function p which depends only on the 
total wealth of the warring alliances.
With this structure of alliances in mind, we 
can consider whether there exist configurations 
of alliances such that the alliances are bilater­
ally stable (no alliance wishes to attack any 
other alliance); and whether there exist configu­
rations of alliances that are immune to devia­
tions by any subset of countries (which might 
quit their current alliance and join with others 
to form a new alliance). We can also consider 
33 As explained in Giovanni Maggi and Morelli (006), 
a unanimity requirement for collective action is the norm 
when the participation of all allies is necessary and the 
value of future expected cooperation with the other allies is 
not sufficient to convince a dissenting member to go along 
with the decision of a majority. When the participation of 
all allies is not necessary, the formation of a “coalition of 
the willing” can suffice. We do not consider this distinc­
tion here. See James D. Morrow (99) for the view that 
alliances entail a pledge of future coordination between 
the allies. Note also that the degree of consensus necessary 
in an alliance could be different depending on whether it 
is a defensive or an offensive alliance. A world with large 
defensive alliances and small offensive ones could be quite 
stable.
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of potential opponents (countries or alliances), 
then if countries were not too biased, the core 
would be very large, as unbiased countries or 
alliances would not wish to go to war in the face 
of such a technology. Thus, the incentives to 
form alliances are more prevalent when relative 
wealth swings the anticipated outcome more 
dramatically.
When we allow for configurations with het­
erogeneity of bias levels, it is difficult to char­
acterize conditions for the nonemptiness of the 
core, or to determine which alliances are most 
likely to form. However, we can still explore a 
few things.
It is possible to have alliance configurations 
that are bilaterally stable and such that no indi­
vidual country would strictly want to quit its 
existing alliance either to be alone or to join 
another alliance. Let us call such an alliance 
configuration individually stable. Let w denote 
the total wealth of an alliance.
PROPOSITION : Consider any parameters C 
and G, and any continuous p such that p 1w, W2 , 
w/W when w/W approaches 0.34 If there exist 
at least two countries with biases close enough 
to , biases of countries are bounded above, and 
there are enough countries such that each coun-
try’s wealth is sufficiently small relative to the 
total world wealth, then there exists a division 
of countries into two alliances that is individu-
ally stable. In such a situation, a single alliance 
of all countries is also individually stable.
The proof is relatively straightforward, and 
hence we simply outline it. Separate the two 
countries with lowest biases. Then, around each, 
form an alliance so that the total wealths in the 
two alliances are as close to each other as pos­
sible. Given the continuity of p, the probability 
of either alliance winning a war approaches 
1/2. With a small enough bias, the least biased 
country in each alliance will prefer not to go to 
war. Consider any country switching alliances. 
Their wealth, if small enough relative to total 
wealth, will make too small a change in prob­
abilities of outcomes to change the incentives 
34 More precisely, consider p such that p 1w, W2W/w S 0 
as w S 0, for any fixed W . 0.
weaker deviations, asking whether there is any 
single country that wishes to quit its current alli­
ance and would be unanimously accepted into 
some other alliance. Finally, we can differenti­
ate between offensive and defensive alliances.
Let us begin with a couple of examples that 
make clear some of the issues that arise. The 
first example illustrates why there are interest­
ing alliance issues that arise and why we might 
want to move beyond simply studying bilateral 
stability.
Example 7. Consider three equal sized countries 
with w1 5 w2 5 w3 and B 5 B 5 B3. If the 
corresponding B’s are not too high, this could 
be bilaterally stable. However, this is not neces­
sarily coalitionally stable. Two countries might 
have an incentive to form an (offensive) alli­
ance and exclude the third country. This could 
strengthen them so that they might either wish 
to go to war regardless of any transfers, and both 
benefit in expected terms from doing so, or to 
obtain a transfer. For example, in the case of 
unbiased countries and higher wealth winning, 
two countries that band together expect to gain 
from going to war with the third country.
The next example illustrates that countries 
could form alliances, not for offensive purposes 
(as above), but instead for defensive purposes.
Example 8. Consider three countries where one’s 
wealth is twice the size of each of the others. 
By forming an alliance, for some choices of Bi’s, 
the two smaller countries avoid being attacked 
or having to pay a transfer. For example, if it 
is the greatest wealth that wins, then separately 
the two smaller countries are sure to lose a war, 
while if allied they have an even chance of 
winning.
Clearly, from the examples above, it is pos­
sible that there will not exist any configuration 
of countries or alliances that is bilaterally stable 
(so that no alliance would attack another in the 
absence of any transfers).
These examples also suggest that the incen­
tive to form an alliance (offensive and defensive, 
respectively) derives from the sensitivity of the p 
function. If p were independent of wealth, then 
countries would not gain at all from forming 
an alliance. If the probability of winning were 
proportional to the relative wealth for any pair 
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of the alliances.35 The only remaining possibil­
ity is that a country could gain from autarchy. 
However, in that case, providing countries are 
small enough relative to total wealth, even with 
maximal bias, (3) fails to hold for the departing 
country, as its probability of winning is so small 
relative to the maximal potential gains that it 
will not have an incentive to go to war with one 
of the (large) alliances.
Comparing the situation described in exam­
ple 7 with the constructed stability of a pair of 
alliances in Proposition , one can conclude that 
in our model a “bipolar” system will (under the 
right circumstances) be stable when a multipolar 
one may not be.36
IV.  Further Results and Discussion
As should be clear from some of the analysis 
above, this basic model of political bias opens 
the door for much future research. Let us com­
ment on a few of the more obvious areas for fur­
ther exploration.
First of all, one can examine the predictions of 
the model empirically. One can do this by a struc­
tural fit of the model, estimating wealth, costs, 
gains, and war technology (p) directly from the 
data, and either imputing the biases or estimat­
ing them based on other political variables. The 
predictions of the model about the role of the 
technology of war could also lead to interesting 
empirical research on historical data.
One can also develop variations on the model 
that endogenize various parameters (other than 
bias) that we have taken to be exogenous. Let us 
mention a few ideas in this direction.
• The model could be coupled with a growth 
model so that wealths change over time. As 
wealths change, so will incentives to go to 
war (and incentives to capture territory to 
help with growth), and one could track how 
35 The only possible exception is if the least biased coun­
try leaves and the remaining countries are strongly biased, 
but then that can lead only to the biased country alliance 
wanting to attack the other alliance, which does not benefit 
the country that switched.
36 This is in line with the general concerns about tripolar 
systems, for instance, as expressed by Morton A. Kaplan 
(957). For counterarguments about the special stability 
features of tripolar systems, see Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and 
John H. Aldrich (97) and Wagner (96).
the economics of growth interacts with the 
incentives for international conflict.
• One could enrich the technology of war to 
allow for investments in arms, so that the 
probability of winning a war depended on 
military spending and not simply on wealth 
directly.
• We could enrich the model to endogenize the 
timing and choice of confrontation, so that 
we not only examine stability or the choices 
of two countries once faced with war, but 
also model more completely how it is that 
two countries start to consider a war and 
how this might depend on the more general 
environment.
Beyond such enrichment of the model, we 
note other aspects of the current model that 
deserve further attention. We have limited the 
transfers that can be made to those from one 
country to another. For example, we have not 
considered situations where transfers can be 
made in both directions simultaneously, nor 
have we allowed a country to buy off another 
country’s leader directly, or a country to buy off 
its own leader. To see some of the issues, note 
that under a strict interpretation of the model, 
biased leaders would like to make transfers back 
and forth to each other. They see only part of 
the costs and appropriate a larger share of the 
gains of any mutual transfers. Essentially, they 
could loot each other’s countries. While this is 
plausible within the model, it is partly because 
we have modeled all sorts of distorted incen­
tives that leaders might have to go to war (glory, 
power gains, personal ambitions, etc.) through 
the lens of a pure financial bias. Nevertheless, 
while such cross­looting activity might seem 
contrived, it is worthy of further study, as the 
incentives for such activity are strong. This is 
also true simply of allowing a country to make 
transfers directly to the leader of a country, as 
this can make the impact of a transfer larger. 
Neither of these completely eliminates war, 
even with commitment, as the biases of the two 
countries’ leaders may be too high to overcome; 
but this could add leverage to the transfers. Of 
course, if all parties involved can make trans­
fers, and complete commitment on the part of 
all parties is possible, then an efficient outcome 
can be realized. So some imperfection in the 
bargaining is needed for wars to occur.
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side is bounded above by . Essentially, even if 
the country is sure to win the war, it does not 
wish to go to war because the costs outweigh the 
spoils of war against a much smaller country.37 
Thus, the model displays a novel “endogenous 
limit to the expansion of an empire,” in contrast 
with the systemic explanations in the literature.
Interestingly, depending on the technology 
of war, as one country becomes much wealthier 
it may no longer wish to go to war, but it may 
become an attractive target for smaller coun­
tries, since they may have much to gain and 
little to lose.3 Whether or not this is the case 
depends on how fast pji increases in wj. In the 
long run (i.e., after each pair of countries has 
faced the temptation of war or gone to war suf­
ficiently many times), a war between countries 
of very different wealth (winners and losers of 
past wars, respectively) will be possible only if 
the poorer country wants it.
Appendix
Let wji 5 wj/wi.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION :
We know that (3) is the condition to satisfy 
for j to be willing to go to war against i in the 
absence of transfers. Similarly, country i wishes 
to go to war with country j if and only if
(0)  1 2 pji . 
1 1 CG
1 1 Biwji
.
Part (iii) follows directly from (3) and (0), as 
both right­hand sides are increasing in C/G.
Next, note that from (3) and (0) it follows that 
both countries want to go to war if and only if
()  1 2
1 1 CG
1 1 Biwji
 . pji . 
1 1 CG
1 1 Bjwij
.
37 It might be more reasonable to presume that the costs 
of going to war against a much smaller country are small. 
If, however, the costs of going to war have any lower bound, 
the conclusion will still hold.
3 Again, this seems to be consistent with the history of 
how the largest empires came to an end after a sequence of 
attacks by weaker challengers.
A. dynamics
As our analysis has been static, and yet inter­
national relations are clearly dynamic, we close 
with some observations on this topic.
The most basic and important aspect that 
dynamics introduces is that as countries get 
richer, their incentives change. As a country j 
has won past wars, three things happen. First, 
its wealth increases, and so the wij 5 wi/wj ratios 
it faces will decrease. This in turn has a sec­
ond effect which is that pji increases. Third, as 
more wealth is acquired, the pivotal agent’s per­
centage share of the wealth increases and so Bj 
decreases. To see this, note that before a war the 
agent’s share is aj. After the war, if the country 
wins, the agent’s share is
()  
aj 11 2 C 2wj 1 a r   j  Gwi11 2 C 2wj 1 Gwi .
If a9j . aj, then this new share is larger than aj. 
Thus, the new Bj is a9j over this new share, and 
so as a country keeps winning wars, Bj will 
decrease.
Let us examine the implications of these 
changes over time. We know from (3) that a 
country will want to go to war (without consid­
eration of transfers) if
(9)  pji . 
1 1 CG
1 1 Bj
wi
wj
 .
As we see from this, if a country has become 
wealthier through the winning of past wars, then 
the right­hand side of this expression will have 
increased as both Bj and wij will have decreased 
(if we are holding the wealth of a given oppo­
nent constant). On the other hand, the left­hand 
side will also go up as pji increases.
While we cannot say what the short­term 
effects of this are, we can say that a country will 
not wish to keep going to war for too long. This 
follows from noting that pji is bounded above 
by , while wij can go to 0. As a country becomes 
much wealthier than other countries, it no longer 
desires to go to war, as the right­hand side of (9) 
will converge to  1 1C/G2 , while the left­hand 
SEPTEMBER 20071370 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
It is clear that if Bi 5 Bj 5 , then the inequal­
ities in () require that
  2 
1 1 CG
1 1 wji
 . 
1 1 CG
1 1 wij
.
To see that this is impossible, rewrite the 
inequality above as
  1 wij 2
1 1 CG
wji
 . 1 1 CG.
This simplifies to
 2wij
C
G . 
C
G,
which is clearly impossible. This proves (i).
The proof of (ii) derives from the following 
observation: the left­hand side of () converges 
to  as Bi gets large, and the right­hand side of 
() converges to 0 as Bj gets large.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION : 
As j wishes to go to war but i does not, (3) 
holds but (0) does not. The condition that needs 
to be satisfied for country j to no longer wish to 
go to war against i if offered tij . 0 is
 11 2 C 2 G 2ajwj 1 pjiG 1ajwj 1 a r   j  wi 2
   # ajwj 1 a r   j  tij.
This simplifies to
()  pjiG 1wj 1 Bjwi 2  #  1C 1 G 2wj 1 Bj tij.
Similarly, the condition for i to be willing to 
make a transfer tij . 0 to avoid a war is
(3)  11 2 pji 2G 1wi 1 Biwj 2  
   # 1C 1 G 2wi 2 tij.
Note that we assume that the pivotal agent in 
country j gets the same proportion 1a9j 2 of tij as 
it would if it were a spoil of war, and the pivotal 
agent in country i pays the same proportion 1ai 2 
of tij as it risks its wealth in a war.
Let tpi 1Bi 2 be the transfer that makes country i 
(which wishes to avoid war) indifferent between 
going to war and paying such a transfer, i.e., 
the transfer that makes (3) hold as equality. In 
other words, tpi 1Bi 2 is the maximum transfer that 
i is willing to make in order to avoid the war. 
Then, from (3),
(4)  tpi 1Bi2 5 1C 1 G2wi 2 1 2 pji2G 1wi 1 Biwj2.
Substituting (4) in (), a transfer can be 
made so that country j no longer wishes to go 
to war if
 pjiG 1wj 1 Bjwi 2 # 1C 1 G2wj 1 Bj 1C 1 G2wi 
 2 Bj 1 2 pji 2G 1wi 1 Biwj 2 .
This can be rewritten as
(5)  
C
G $ 
11 2 pji 2 1BiBj 2 1 2
1 1 Bjwij
.
When we combine this with (3) we obtain the 
following characterization of when transfers 
avoid a war:
(6)  pji 1 1 Bjwij 2 2  . CG 
   . 
11 2 pji 2 1BiBj 2 1 211 1 Bjwij 2 .
The comparative statics in the proposition are 
then clear.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Given proposition (i), we know that when 
two unbiased countries meet, the situation with­
out transfers is either such that they both wish 
to avoid war or that one country alone wishes 
to go to war. If the situation is the former, we 
are done. If it is the latter, then assume without 
loss of generality that j is the one that wants to 
go to war and i is the one that does not. We have 
established above that, in this case, the avail­
ability of transfers eliminates the incentive of j 
to go to war if (5) holds. Thus, the result fol­
lows, noting that the right­hand side of (5) is 0 
with two unbiased countries.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Recall from (4) that tpi 1Bi 2 is the maximum 
transfer that i would be willing to make to avoid 
war in a case where i would not (strictly) desire 
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as otherwise j could deviate by raising their bias 
and be strictly better off. It follows that Bi $ , 
or else i would be better off deviating and stat­
ing  (and then going to war, since tpi 1Bi 2 . tpi 12 
when Bi , ). Similarly for j. If both were equal 
to , then it would be direct to check that tpi 12 . 
trj 12 , which is then a contradiction.
Next, let us show (ii). We know from above 
that Bi $  and Bj $ . The other conditions, 
respectively, are precisely that one country (say 
j) weakly wishes to go to war, and that trj 1Bj 2 
5 tpi 1Bi 2 . Following the logic above, these are 
necessary for equilibrium, and are also clearly 
sufficient.
Finally, we show (iii). If pijwj # Cwi, then it 
follows that tpi 12 . trj 1Bj 2 for all Bj. This implies 
that regardless of j’s announcement, i could 
avoid a war and make a payment of less than 
tpi 12 by setting Bi 5 . Since i prefers this to 
war, war could not be an equilibrium outcome. 
Thus, any war equilibrium requires that pijwj . 
Cwi for both countries. To see the converse, note 
that if pijwj . Cwi for both countries, then there 
exists Bj . Bj
w such that tpi 12 , trj 1Bj 2 and simi­
larly there is such a Bi . Bi
w with tpj 12 , tri 1Bi 2 . 
Such a pair form an equilibrium where war 
ensues, since both strictly prefer to go to war, 
and they could avoid war only by announcing 
some bias below  and making a payment above 
their maximum willingness to pay (as they are 
truly unbiased).
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